Publikationsliste KOPS

Modern welfare states compete with private providers of welfare in offering economic security. This is most evident in the case of pensions competing with life insurance and private pensions as well as of public health insurance competing with private insurance providers. The common view of this public–private relationship is one of a trade-off: longitudinally, political scientists describe how retrenchment was pushed by privatized welfare, whereas economists trace the crowding-out of private to public welfare provisions. Cross-sectionally, they claim that countries have lower public spending levels because they have a large private sector. We suggest a more nuanced view. Drawing on a new long-run panel data of public pension and private life insurance expenditures and contributions in 20 OECD countries since Bismarck to the current day, we show that in the postwar years a cross-sectional trade-off emerged, which then faded. Longitudinally, complementary relationships of public and private provision growth have become the norm. We argue theoretically and show empirically that trade-offs only occur if governments still hold (waning) anti-interventionist and pro-market views.

Climate change and most climate policies affect and reinforce different forms of inequalities. For instance, climate change policies that aim to change consumer behavior by increasing the price tag of goods and services that cause carbon emissions often carry a disproportionately higher burden (in terms of financial cost) to those with lower incomes. They can thereby either exacerbate existing income inequalities or contribute to generating new ones. Meanwhile, refraining from engaging with climate mitigation policies will incur other detrimental societal costs: the financial burden and the harmful consequences of climate change that future generations will have to bear if nothing is done. In this paper, we examine how the immediate economic inequality citizens face from climate mitigation policies (regarding carbon taxation) weighs against the long-term generational inequalities future generations will experience. We study how both types of inequality relate to policy support for climate change mitigation policies in the context of Germany. The German case is of special interest because a recent court ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court allows us to test whether making people aware of a new legal reality can bridge the gap between the economic and generational inequality. Our findings using a between-subjects survey experiment fielded among German citizens (N=6,319) in 2022 show that immediate economic concerns trump future generational concerns, generally making citizens less supportive of the policy. This negative support is, however, somewhat mitigated by the supportive signal from the court ruling.

To what extent have Latin America's Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs adopted different forms of conditionality? What are the main features of this variation, if any? In this article, we show that conditionalities vary across Latin America's CCTs and across time within programs. Drawing on existing conceptualizations of welfare conditionality and a novel, purpose-built dataset covering 16 countries from 1997 to 2019, we analyze the evolution and variation in the design of welfare conditionality in the region. We find that conditionalities among Latin America's CCTs exhibit many different types and also vary significantly in how the program's main attributes—behavioral requirements, monitoring, and sanctioning rules—combine and evolve across time in each program. These combinations show that governments do not consistently produce “pure” CCT models but instead use conditionality features in many different ways and also adjust them over time, frequently to make more explicit what they expect from CCT recipients.

Internet shutdowns have become a popular instrument for repressive regimes to silence dissent in a digitized world. While authorities seek to suppress opponents by imposing Internet outages, we know little about how the public reacts to such incisive measures. The regime might face anger and resentment from the public as a response to Internet deprivation. Why do regimes still use Internet shutdowns when they do not only face economic but also societal losses? In this paper, I argue that Internet shutdowns lower the public’s evaluation of the political leadership as citizens blame the government for the service outages. For the analysis, I combine fine-grained data on Internet outages with survey data from the Afrobarometer and apply an “unexpected event during survey design.” Results show that citizens do not hold the government accountable for Internet disruptions, thus making Internet shutdowns a powerful tool for autocrats to silent dissent digitally.

Over the last decades, many democracies progressed in the political inclusion of Indigenous people and the recognition of their rights. Does this contribute to how satisfied Indigenous people are with how democracy works? Prior empirical evidence suggests it does. As yet, there is, however, little study of the underlying mechanisms and we should not assume a categorically positive correlation between political equality and satisfaction with democracy. Instead, Indigenous affairs need to be sufficiently politicized to matter for Indigenous people's satisfaction with democracy. I test this argument in the case of the Sámi people in Norway and Sweden. While political inequality is comparatively higher in Sweden, Sámi issues are less politicized. Using novel original survey data, I find that here, satisfaction with democracy is not correlated with Sámi ethnicity. Satisfaction levels among Norwegian Sámi, though, are significantly lower than among their non-Indigenous compatriots and strongly shaped by considerations of political inequality.

Numerous studies show that properly designed economic sanctions can force the target to refrain from violating international norms. However, policymakers cannot integrate this finding into their ex ante assessments of whether more forceful coercive measures could prevent military coups, human rights violations, or a war of aggression such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this article, we address this shortcoming and introduce counterfactual predictions to answer the what-if question of whether adequate sanctions by the European Union and the United States could have provoked targets to abandon severe norm violations. To this end, a training data set from 1989 to 2008 is used to predict the success of sanctions from 2009 to 2015. Our policy counterfactuals for key sanction cases suggest that stricter EU coercion against Russia after the annexation of Crimea could have triggered policy concessions from the regime of President Putin.

How do citizens perceive labor market risks related to digitalization and the green transition, and how do these risk perceptions translate into preferences for social policies? We address these questions in this paper by studying the policy preferences of individual workers on how governments should deal with the two labor market challenges of digitalization and the green transition. Employing novel cross-country comparative survey data including a vignette experiment for six advanced postindustrial economies, we probe to what extent the different labor market challenges are associated with differences in preferences, distinguishing between support for social investment policies on the one hand and compensatory policies on the other. A first finding is that even though individuals perceive different levels of labor market risk due to the green transition and digitalization, their preferences for social policy responses do not differ systematically across the two risks. Instead, we find that social policy preferences are affected by individual-level and, to some extent, country-level contextual factors. Confirming previous work, higher perceived labor market risk is associated with more support for compensatory policies but less support for social investment.

Differentiated integration is often considered a solution to gridlock in the European Union. However, questions remain concerning its perceived legitimacy among the public. While research shows that most citizens are not, in principle, opposed to differentiated integration – although support varies across different differentiated integration models and different country contexts – we still know little about the role institutional design plays in citizens’ evaluations of differentiated integration. This article inspects how citizens evaluate different hypothetical differentiated integration arrangements, with varying decision-making procedures, using a conjoint experiment. We ask whether institutional arrangements can overcome citizens’ preference heterogeneity over differentiated integration, and thereby foster the legitimacy of a differentiated European Union. We find that while a majority of citizens care about the inclusiveness of differentiated integration arrangements, they also support limiting the number of veto points. Our analysis also reveals noteworthy differences across citizens with pro- and anti-European Union attitudes in the perceived fairness of differentiated integration arrangements.

Why, despite increased female support, do social democratic parties (SDPs) in most Western European countries face electoral decline? To study this puzzle, we harness a well-documented regularity: diminishing support for SDPs by manual workers and their increased support for the far right. We contend that this trend is intensified in contexts where the economic positions of SDPs align with market-oriented policies or converge with those of the far right. Additionally, as men are disproportionately represented among manual workers, this shift contributes to the reversal of the gender gap in support for SDPs. Drawing on public opinion data from 18 countries spanning half a century, along with labor and party economic position data, our findings substantiate this argument.

While girls have better grades than boys in high school, this does not translate into better performance of young women, as compared to young men, in university. Due to the high signalling value of university grades for subsequent income and employment outcomes, this has important consequences for gender inequalities at labour market entry. However, previous studies have not yet examined the potential barriers that might limit women’s ability to maintain their previous academic achievement at the university level. Drawing on the nation-wide Student Survey, this study addresses this shortcoming by investigating perceived discrimination against women and perceived competition among students as two potential correlates. Our findings first confirm that while girls have better grades in high school than boys, this has reversed at the university level. Further, high school grades are less strongly correlated with university grades for girls compared to boys. Our results highlight that young women perceive there to be more discrimination against women as well as higher levels of competition within their field of study, than do their male peers. The study further demonstrates that an increased level of perceived discrimination is strongly associated with lower university performance for young women, thereby plausibly hindering their ability to reach their full academic potential.

Education is one of the strongest predictors of political participation at the individual level. However, the association between education and participation varies across countries, which previous studies attribute mainly to institutions like electoral systems. Drawing on policy feedback and political socialization theories, we suggest an alternative explanation: education policies generate powerful and lasting policy feedback effects in adolescence, which continue to influence patterns of participation among adults. More concretely, we argue that policies aimed at de-stratifying secondary education (i.e., promoting more comprehensive models of education) are associated with a decrease in political inequality. We empirically investigate our argument in Germany, where education policies vary across sub-national units (Länder) and over time. We leverage this variation by combining data on Land-level policies with data on individual’s participation. Our results show that de-stratifying education policies have reduced in inequality in various forms of political participation, interest, and efficacy, but not in turnout.

Recent studies show that, when salience is high, ‘heterogeneous lobbying coalitions’ uniting business and civil society groups are more successful in achieving their lobbying objectives than homogeneous coalitions. It is therefore surprising that a coalition of tech firms and civil society activists failed to prevent the adoption of the EU’s contested 2019 Copyright Directive, which constitutes a significant shift in the Union’s approach to online content regulation. This article argues that proponents of the policy change successfully undermined the lobbying coalition by invoking notions of ‘digital sovereignty’ and by delegitimizing activists as Silicon Valley’s ‘useful idiots’. Combining process-tracing of the lobbying processes and content analysis of European Parliament debates, the article shows how legislators employed delegitimation and sovereignty claims to justify their non-responsiveness to public protests. The article contributes to the interest group literature and debates on ‘digital sovereignty’ by demonstrating its strategic use in the policy-making process.

Scholars and policymakers widely view identity as a key driver of African citizens’ political engagement. In doing so, however, they have emphasized ethnicity and largely sidelined other identities, including gender, local origin, shared residency, and partisanship. In this paper, we explore which identities drive political engagement and why they do so. We employ an original survey experiment that includes various identities and other incentives that may drive citizens’ participation around Zambia’s 2021 national elections. We find that partisanship most influences individuals’ stated willingness to campaign for a candidate or meet with an MP, while ethnicity and social incentives play less significant roles. Finally, we explore the mechanisms underpinning these results and find that citizens anticipate sanctions if they fail to support a co-partisan but not a co-ethnic candidate. These findings have important implications for understanding political engagement and democratic development throughout the region.

Research on political participation almost unanimously assumes that social pressure by neighbors induces collective behavior. Yet most experimental studies focus on individually based forms of political and civic behavior, such as voting and recycling, in Western industrialized societies. The paper tests the effect of neighborly social pressure on collective action in Tunisia. In a field experiment, I manipulate whether neighbors or community outsiders invite citizens to contribute to a public good (i.e., trash collection). I run the experiment in three neighborhoods of varying socioeconomic composition in Tunis (n = 1199). I do not find evidence to suggest that neighborly social pressure encourages participation in neighborhood cleanups, with low participation rates both for the neighbor and outsider contact conditions. While the effect of social pressure does not significantly vary across communities, overall participation rates do. Residents of the poor neighborhood are most likely to respond in a socially desirable way when asked about their intentions but least likely to participate. The paper also discusses some limitations of the study and outlines avenues for future research.

This study focuses on the impact of three attributes of migrants – their reasons for migration, religion, and level of religiosity – on public support for allowing migrants to come and live in Israel. We rely on a factorial survey that was conducted in a representative sample of the Israeli Jewish population analyzing the assessments of 600 respondents of various vignettes (N = 3,595) of hypothetical migrants about admitting them to the country. The findings reveal that Israeli Jews do not evaluate all immigrant groups equally. Preferences for specific groups of migrants are primarily structured along two main attributes: religion and reasons for migration. The result is a hierarchical distinction between immigrants of Jewish ancestry and those who are non-Jewish. Jewish repatriates are perceived as “deserving migrants” who can make legitimate claims about belonging to the host society. As such, they enjoy an ethno-religious premium based on ancestral rights. By contrast, there is less support for the entry of non-Jewish migrants, whether asylum seekers or labor migrants, as their presence is viewed as a threat to the Jewish character of the state and the hegemony of the Jewish majority. The impact of the immigrants’ attributes on attitudes varies based on the level of religiosity of the Jewish population, especially in the case of non-Jewish migrants. Support is stronger in the case of secular respondents and much weaker among their more religious counterparts. The findings are discussed in light of existing theories.

Across many countries, increases in inequality driven by rising top incomes and wealth have not been accompanied by growing popular concern. In fact, citizens in unequal societies are less concerned than those in more egalitarian societies. Understanding how the general public perceive richness is an essential step towards resolving this paradox. We discuss findings from focus group research in London, UK, a profoundly and visibly unequal city, which sought to explore public perceptions of richness and the rich. Participants from diverse socio-economic backgrounds discussed their views of the ‘wealthy’ and the ‘super rich’ with reference to both vast economic resources and more intangible aspects, including, crucially, security. High levels of wealth and income were perceived to be necessary for achieving security for oneself and one’s family. The security of the rich was discussed in contrast to participants’ own and others’ insecurity in the context of a (neo)liberal welfare regime – specifically, insecurity about housing, personal finances, social security, health care and the future of the welfare state. In unequal countries, where insecurity is widespread, lack of confidence in collective welfare state provision may serve in the public imagination to legitimate private wealth accumulation and richness as a form of self-protection.

Recent studies on classic psychedelics have suggested that their use is associated with psychological strengths and resilience, thereby conferring users a type of psychological protection relative to non-users. However, this idea has been brought into question by recent findings suggesting that lifetime users of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) report worse mental health during stressful experiences. The current study addresses these mixed findings by examining whether LSD use prior to a stressful experience buffers against the psychological distress experienced in the wake of the stressful experience. This study draws on openly-available data from the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (2008–2019) on 5,067,553 (weighted) unemployed, job seeking individuals experiencing job loss. Using purposeful respondent exclusion criteria to establish temporal precedence of the variables under investigation, this study offers a straightforward test of whether LSD use confers psychological resilience to naturalistic users. LSD use prior to job loss was associated with a higher likelihood of severe psychological distress following job loss, regardless of whether sociodemographic variables were controlled for or not. In sum, this study fails to find evidence for LSD-conferred psychological resilience in naturalistic users in the wake of a stressful experience.

Implicit and explicit gender biases in media representations of individuals have long existed. Women are less likely to be represented in gender-neutral media content (representation bias), and their face-to-body ratio in images is often lower (face-ism bias). In this article, we look at representativeness and face-ism in search engine image results. We systematically queried four search engines (Google, Bing, Baidu, Yandex) from three locations, using two browsers and in two waves, with gender-neutral (person, intelligent person) and gendered (woman, intelligent woman, man, intelligent man) terminology, accessing the top 100 image results. We employed automatic identification for the individual’s gender expression (female/male) and the calculation of the face-to-body ratio of individuals depicted. We find that, as in other forms of media, search engine images perpetuate biases to the detriment of women, confirming the existence of the representation and face-ism biases. In-depth algorithmic debiasing with a specific focus on gender bias is overdue.

We examine labor supply responses to piece rate changes relative to the reference piece rate (RR). In experimental conditions without RR, labor supply increases monotonically with the actual piece rate. In conditions with RR, labor supply increases both when the piece rate rises and falls relative to RR. This non-monotonicity in labor supply responses to piece rate changes around RR is consistent with the effects of framing a given level of income as gain or loss relative to the target level induced by RR: loss aversion makes subjects work more at a given piece rate when the implied income is in the loss rather than gain domain. However, the framing effects disappear when the piece rate could both rise or fall relative to RR.