Publikationsliste KOPS

What is an effective vaccination policy to end the COVID-19 pandemic? We address this question in a model of the dynamics of policy effectiveness drawing upon the results of a large panel survey implemented in Germany during the first and second waves of the pandemic. We observe increased opposition to vaccinations were they to be legally required. In contrast, for voluntary vaccinations, there was higher and undiminished support. We find that public distrust undermines vaccine acceptance, and is associated with a belief that the vaccine is ineffective and, if enforced, compromises individual freedom. We model how the willingness to be vaccinated may vary over time in response to the fraction of the population already vaccinated and whether vaccination has occurred voluntarily or not. A negative effect of enforcement on vaccine acceptance (of the magnitude observed in our panel or even considerably smaller) could result in a large increase in the numbers that would have to be vaccinated unwillingly in order to reach a herd-immunity target. Costly errors may be avoided if policy makers understand that citizens' preferences are not fixed but will be affected both by the crowding-out effect of enforcement and by conformism. Our findings have broad policy applicability beyond COVID-19 to cases in which voluntary citizen compliance is essential because state capacities are limited and because effectiveness may depend on the ways that the policies themselves alter citizens' beliefs and preferences.

Age heterogeneity in Western workforces is increasing, generating potential informational benefits as well as harmful age‐based social categorizations. When can firms benefit from age heterogeneity? Building on the categorization‐elaboration model, we propose the average age distance between employees as a fundamental contingency. Using a longitudinal archival sample of 3,336 Belgian firms (2012–2015), we find that firms with a high level of age heterogeneity are less productive when employees' average distance is great (Study 1). Through an online experiment with 260 US participants, we show that employees in age‐heterogeneous workforces are less willing to engage in inter‐age cooperative contact and knowledge exchange under a great level of average age distance (Study 2). Our findings support that great distances foster age‐based social categorizations that undermine the productive information elaborations between employees of different ages. This broadens our knowledge on the implications of workforce age diversity and helps organizations understand when they can(not) reap the productivity benefits of their age‐diverse workforce. Moreover, this study's theory and implications are relevant to other types of diversity for which both heterogeneity and distance are meaningful constructs. We also discuss the practical implications of this study.

Since 2015, an enormous number of refugees have migrated to Germany. To obtain qualifi ed jobs, many of them attend prevocational preparation classes. The aims of these classes are mainly the acquisition of German language skills and preparation for subsequent vocational education and training. This paper examines (1) the transitions of young refugees after prevocational preparation classes and (2) what factors predict the transition to the next educational step. Using data from the fi rst two measurement points of a longitudinal survey (t1 during the prevocational preparation class and t2 one year later), we surveyed 333 students in Southwest Germany (82% male; mean age = 18.9 years). Instruments included an online questionnaire, an online test of cognitive ability, and an online test of German language skills. Approximately 37 percent of the students repeated the prevocational preparation class, whereas 60 percent moved on to the next educational step. German language skills at t1 and contact with people helping refugees (t1) predicted the probability of the transition to a “regular” educational pathway. Other variables, such as the educational background of the young refugees and of their parents, personality, motivation, and aspirations, had no significant effects. The findings can be interpreted in terms of the primary (language skills) and secondary eff ects of refugees’ ethnic background (information about the education system through contact with locals).

This paper examines the transnational dimensions of low-level conflict and state repression. In this regard, special emphasis is placed on the role of political regimes. Drawing on a simple model, we argue that democracy has opposing effects on conflict intensity. On one hand, democracy satisfies demand for political participation and thus reduces conflict potential, while, on the other hand, we highlight that domestic democracy may spur dissatisfaction and conflict abroad, which, in turn, may induce conflict spillovers. As a result, the net effect of democracy on low-level conflict and state repression is ambiguous and depends on the level of democracy in the neighborhood: We predict that democracy is more pacifying in democratic environments and may spur conflict in autocratic environments. By the symmetry of the model, we also predict that democratic environments are more pacifying for democratic countries and may spur conflict in autocracies. Empirical evidence using panel data on different types of low-level conflict and state repression for 160 countries in the period from 1950 to 2011 supports these hypotheses. Additionally, two case studies illustrate the mechanisms of our model.

Do France and Germany lead the euro zone? We argue that the governments of these two countries jointly and successfully used institutional as well as ideational leadership – both at the domestic as well as at the European levels – when creating the Economic and Monetary Union in the 1980s and 1990s. During the euro zone crisis, however, the two respective governments mainly relied on institutional leadership, but neglected the ideational component of leadership. In consequence, member states only agreed upon lowest common denominator solutions, leaving the institutional setup of the Economic and Monetary Union incomplete. More ideational engagement by the French and German governments and the investment of political capital, in our view, are necessary for the adoption of more far-ranging substantial reforms. This would make the euro zone – and more generally the European integration project – more resilient in the years to come.

Effective states govern by some combination of enforcement and voluntary compliance. To contain the COVID-19 pandemic, a critical decision is the extent to which policy makers rely on voluntary as opposed to enforced compliance, and nations vary along this dimension. While enforcement may secure higher compliance, there is experimental and other evidence that it may also crowd out voluntary motivation. How does enforcement affect citizens' support for anti-COVID-19 policies? A survey conducted with 4,799 respondents toward the end of the first lockdown in Germany suggests that a substantial share of the population will support measures more under voluntary than under enforced implementation. Negative responses to enforcement-termed control aversion-vary across the nature of the policy intervention (e.g., they are rare for masks and frequent for vaccination and a cell-phone tracing app). Control aversion is less common among those with greater trust in the government and the information it provides, and among those who were brought up under the coercive regime of East Germany. Taking account of the likely effectiveness of enforcement and the extent to which near-universal compliance is crucial, the differing degrees of opposition to enforcement across policies suggest that for some anti-COVID-19 policies an enforced mandate would be unwise, while for others it would be essential. Similar reasoning may also be relevant for policies to address future pandemics and other societal challenges like climate change.

This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the impact of bailouts on political turnover and sovereign default risk. We consider a small open economy in which the government has access to official loans conditional on the implementation of austerity policies. There is a two-party system in which both parties care about the population’s welfare but differ in an exogenous utility cost of default. Political turnover is the endogenous outcome of the individual voting behavior. In a quantitative application to the Greek economy, we find that bailouts amplify political turnover risk, which, in turn, elevates sovereign interest spreads. While stricter conditionality fosters the probability of political turnover and sovereign default in the short run, it may mitigate political turnover and default risk in the long run. The frequency of political turnover is U-shaped in the strength of conditionality.

In this article we study the emergence of local solidarity in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis in Germany. The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing lockdown measures have had far-reaching and quite diverse consequences for different social groups, and have increased the need for practical help, childcare, financial aid, but also emotional support to cope with the psychological consequences of social isolation. Hence, even individuals who are not traditionally receivers of informal help have suddenly become dependent on it. Existing research on volunteering, caregiving and donations has shown that the provision of help and volunteer work has a social gradient, and that social inequalities therein can partly be explained by reference to individuals’ attitudes and social networks. Against this backdrop, we ask: (1) Has the COVID-19 pandemic sparked the emergence of a new local solidarity? (2) What types of help are provided, and to whom? (3) How does socio-economic position affect the provision of different forms of help during the COVID-19 crisis? (4) Which sociological mechanisms can explain these inequalities in helping? Using data from a topical online-survey based on a quota sample which was collected, during the heydays of the first lockdown in Germany, we find that one of two respondents engages in some sort of local solidarity. Depending on the recipient and the way of helping – up to half of these helping arrangements has newly emerged and does not build on already existing (pre-crisis) help-arrangements. Differences between income and educational groups can mostly be explained by attitudes and social networks. Embeddedness in formal networks is particularly important for extending help to previously unknown recipients in the community. This article contributes to the literature on the social origins of help and the initiation of social capital during crises in general, and the political discussion about solidarity in the COVID-19 pandemic in particular.